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Hide It or Unbundle It:
A Comparison of the Antitrust Investigations Against
Microsoft in the U.S. and the E.U.
SUE ANN MOTA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Microsoft Corporation, the world’s largest software company,1 has
been facing antitrust scrutiny globally. In the U.S., after what’s been
called the antitrust trial of the century,2 a consent decree was reached between Microsoft, the United States government,3 and several states,4 that
closely resembled the litigated remedy that the remaining states received.
Only Massachusetts appealed the litigated remedy, which was approved by
the appeals court on June 30, 2004.5 In the United States, Microsoft was
required to hide, but not remove, the Internet Explorer browser on the
Windows Operating System.6
While antitrust litigation was ongoing in the United States against Microsoft, the European Union (“E.U.”) was also investigating Microsoft
under E.U. antitrust law.7 In March, 2004, after a five year investigation,
the European Union Commission fined Microsoft 497 million euros, required Microsoft to offer the Windows operating system without Windows
* Professor of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University; J.D., University of Toledo College
of Law, Order of the Coif; M.A. and B.A., Bowling Green State University.
1. Hoover’s Online, Microsoft Corporation, http://www.hoovers.com/microsoft/--ID__14120-/free-co-factsheet.xhtml (accessed Apr. 24, 2005).
2. Kenneth G. Elzinga et al., U.S. v. Microsoft: Remedy or Malady?, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 633,
633 (2001).
3. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002); see infra n. 59 and accompanying
text.
4. N.Y. v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002); see infra nn. 60-66 and accompanying text.
5. Mass. v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see infra nn. 74-77 and accompanying text.
6. Id.
7. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 82 (Feb. 26, 2001), http://europa.eu
.int/comm/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art82_en.html. See generally Amanda Cohen, Surveying
the Microsoft Antitrust Universe, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 333 (2004); Justin O’Dell, Student Author,
Trouble Abroad: Microsoft’s Antitrust Problems Under the Law of the European Union, 30 Ga. J. Intl.
& Comp. L. 101 (2001); see infra n. 79.
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Media Player, and required Microsoft to disclose interfaces to competitors.8 On December 22, 2004, the E.U.’s Court of First Instance denied
Microsoft’s request for a stay of this order, and ordered Microsoft to comply;9 the full appeal is pending at the time of this publication.
This article will examine, compare, and contrast the protracted antitrust
litigation that Microsoft has faced in the U.S. and the E.U. This article will
then examine what further antitrust problems Microsoft may be facing.
II. U.S. V. MICROSOFT
When one thinks of the United States v. Microsoft antitrust litigation,
one usually thinks of the recently concluded action10 brought by the U.S.
Department of Justice and twenty states in 1998. Microsoft’s antitrust investigation was initiated by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) starting in 1990. In 1993, the FTC’s Commissioners voted twice whether to
take action against Microsoft, and the vote was tied two-to-two both times.
Consequently the FTC took no action.11 The Department of Justices’ Antitrust Division then investigated Microsoft, and in 1994 filed a complaint
against Microsoft for violating the Sherman Act sections one12 and two13
8. Microsoft, COMP/C-3/37.792, http://europe.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions
/37792/en.pdf (Mar. 24, 2004) [hereinafter COMP/C-3/37.792]; see infra nn. 85-98 and accompanying
text.
9. Microsoft v. Commn. of the European Communities, T-201/04R2, 2004 E.C.R. ___ (Ct. First
Instance 2004) (available at 2004 WL 2951977); see infra nn. 99-102 and accompanying text.
10. See supra nn. 3-7 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 321 (D.D.C. 1995); see generally Sue Mota, U.S. v.
Microsoft – The Antitrust Sage Continues, 1999 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1 (1999) (providing more information on the prior Microsoft antitrust investigation and litigation).
12. The Sherman Act section one states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1991).
13. The Sherman Act section two states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any
other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

File: Mota-Macroed

2005

Created on: 3/23/2005 8:54:00 PM

HIDE IT OR UNBUNDLE IT

Last Printed: 5/11/2005 12:04:00 PM

185

by engaging in various activities such as entering into unlawful contracts
which unreasonably restrained trade14 and monopolizing the market for
personal computer operating systems.15
The same day that the complaint was filed in 1994, the Department of
Justice and Microsoft filed a consent decree, which prohibited, among
other things, the following: licenses with original equipment (hardware)
manufacturers which lasted longer than one year; licenses with original
equipment manufacturers that prohibit the manufacturers from selling or
licensing any non-Microsoft operating system; and licenses with minimum
commitments for the original equipment manufacturers, whereby the
manufacturer had to license the minimum amount of Microsoft software
whether the manufacturer met the minimum commitment of sales or not.16
In the consent decree, Microsoft was specifically not prohibited from developing integrated products;17 this provision was pivotal in the subsequent
1998 litigation.18 Interestingly, the European Union was involved in the
consent decree as a joint settlement. All three sides signed a stipulation
agreeing to the consent decree.19
Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, the Tunney Act, the
proposed consent decree had to be published for comment before a hearing
was held to determine whether the decree is in the public interest.20 District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin held in 1995 that the consent decree was
not in the public interest because it was too narrow and did not go far
enough against Microsoft’s anticompetitive behavior.21 Both the Department of Justice and Microsoft appealed.
In 1995, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the consent decree was in the public interest, and remanded for reassignment to another judge to enter an order approving the
decree, as per Microsoft’s request.22 In 1997, the Department of Justice
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1999).
14. This action, according to the Department of Justice, violates section one of the Sherman Act.
15. This behavior violated section two of the Sherman Act, according to the Department of Justice.
16. 59 Fed. Reg. 42845, 42845 (Aug. 19 1994) (detailing the Proposed Final Judgment in U.S. v.
Microsoft). The consent decree was to run seventy-eight months.
17. Id. at 42855.
18. See infra n. 22 and accompanying text.
19. See generally Laura E. Keegan, The 1991 U.S./EC. Competition Agreement: A Glimpse of the
Future Through the U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. Window, 2 J. Intl. Leg. Stud. 149 (1996).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1994).
21. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. at 318. Judge Sporkin gave the following four reasons for
his decision: First, the government failed to provide the court with the proper information needed to
make a public interest determination. Second, the decree was too narrow; it covered only MS-DOS and
Windows, not all of Microsoft’s operating systems. Third, the decree did not constitute an effective
antitrust remedy. Fourth, the enforcement and compliance mechanisms were not deemed satisfactory.
22. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463-65 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The case was reassigned
because Judge Sporkin could reasonably cause an objective observer to question his impartiality by
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returned to federal court asking that Microsoft be held in contempt of court
for violating the consent decree by requiring original equipment manufacturers to license and distributing Microsoft Internet Explorer (“IE”) as a
condition of licensing Windows 95; Microsoft responded that IE was allowed as an integrated product.23 The district court issued a preliminary
injunction and appointed a special master.24 Microsoft appealed. In 1998,
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit removed the special master and
reversed the preliminary injunction, giving Microsoft a legal victory.25
Also in 1998, the recently concluded antitrust case began when the
Department of Justice and twenty states26 filed suits against Microsoft alleging violations of the Sherman Act sections one27and two28 and requesting an injunction. Microsoft was alleged to violate section one by agreements with original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) destructing modification of PC start-up sequences, and agreements with Internet Service
providers (“ISPs”), Internet Content Providers (“ICPs”), and others
whereby they would not license or promote non-Microsoft products.29
Again, it was alleged that tying IE to the Windows operating system also
violated the Sherman Act section one.30 Microsoft was alleged to violate
the Sherman Act section two for unlawful maintenance of a monopoly in
the operating system market and unlawful monopolization of web browser
market. District Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson denied Microsoft’s
request for summary judgment,31 and a bench trial ensued on the “fast
track” for the consolidated federal and state cases. The trial lasted from
October 19, 1998 until June 24, 1999.32
doing the following: He inquired into allegations outside the complaint; he relied on the book Hard
Drive not introduced into evidence; he did not fulfill his duty to consider the impact of the anonymity
of amici; he accepted ex parte submissions; and he made several comments which evidenced his distrust of Microsoft’s lawyers and showed his poor view of Microsoft’s practices.
23. 59 Fed. Reg. at 42855.
24. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997).
25. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F. 3d 935, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The district court’s preliminary
injunction was granted without adequate notice to Microsoft and was based on an erroneous reading of
the consent decree concerning integrated products. Id. at 948. There were no exceptional circumstances to warrant a special master. Id. at 956.
26. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998). The states
initially included New York, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, South
Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. One state withdrew and
another settled, leaving eighteen remaining states. The states alleged additional violations under their
state unfair competition laws and alleged claim of monopoly “leveraging,” by using its unlawful monopoly in the operating system market to obtain a competitive advantage in the browser market.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
29. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231 at *4.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *91.
32. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact).
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On November 9, 1999, Judge Jackson issued his extensive findings of
fact, which stated that while Microsoft benefited consumers by including
Internet Explorer with Windows at no extra charge, Microsoft also acted to
the detriment of consumers by engaging in a series of actions to protect
barriers to entry into the market, and this protected Microsoft’s monopoly
from other middleware threats, such as Netscape’s Navigator and Sun’s
Java.33 This in turn caused “serious and far-reaching consumer harm by
distorting competition.”34 Additionally but less directly, consumers were
also hurt by less innovation.35 Most harmful, according to Judge Jackson
in his findings of fact, was the message that Microsoft’s action had conveyed due to its treatment of Intel, IBM, Compaq, Netscape, and others;
Microsoft proved it would use its “market power and immense profits” to
harm anyone that would compete with Microsoft.36
Before the conclusions of law were issued, Judge Jackson appointed
Chief Judge Posner of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to act
as mediator between the parties. While both parties agreed to mediation
and to the mediator, the mediation failed after four months.37
On April 3, 2000, District Judge Jackson gave his conclusions of law
that Microsoft violated section one of the Sherman Act38 by unlawfully
tying its web browser to its operating system, but did not, as a matter of
law, violate section one by exclusive dealings.39 Microsoft violated section
two of the Sherman Act40 by “maintain[ing] its monopoly power by anticompetitive means and attempt[ing] to monopolize the Web browser market.”41 Microsoft was also liable under state law.42
On June 7, 2000, Judge Jackson issued the remedy: Microsoft was required to split the Operating Systems and Application businesses.43 Microsoft appealed all three legal conclusions,44 the factual foundations upon
which they rested,45 and the break-up remedy.46 Microsoft further requested the judgment vacated since, according to Microsoft, Judge Jackson
33. Id. at 110-11.
34. Id. at 111. (Microsoft forced OEMs to ignore consumer demand for another browser by either
shipping hardware with an operating system that only had IE, or by shipping hardware with an operating system that would return IE to the default browser.).
35. Id. at 112.
36. Id.
37. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
39. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of law).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
41. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 35.
42. Id.
43. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64, (D.D.C. 2000) (final judgment).
44. Supra nn. 37-40 and accompanying text.
45. Supra nn. 32-36 and accompanying text.
46. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 35.
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violated his duty of impartiality by ethical violations such as making impermissible public statements while the case was pending and having impermissible ex parte contacts.47
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2001
agreed in part and disagreed in part.48 The Court affirmed in part the district court’s ruling that Microsoft monopolized the market of operating
systems for personal computers49 in violation of section two of the
Sherman Act.50 The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s conclusion of law that Microsoft violated section two in attempting to monopolize the browser market.51 The Court remanded the tying issue52 under
section one of the Sherman Act.53 Finally, the final judgment on the breakup remedy was vacated because Judge Jackson had made impermissible ex
parte contacts by holding secret meetings with the media and made offensive comments about Microsoft officials outside the court room.54 The
case was remanded to yet a different, third, district court judge.55 The
United States Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari.56
On remand, United States District Court Judge Keller-Kotelly ordered
settlement discussions,57 which resulted in the United States and nine states
reaching a consent decree with Microsoft.58 A hearing was held on a revised consent decree, with the Computer and Communications Industry
Association (“CCIA”) and the Software and Information Industry Association (“SIIA”) participating as amici curiae, but not as interveners.
On November 1, 2002, the district court held that the revised consent
decrees with the United States,59 and the settling states,60 would be approved as in the public interest under the Tunney Act,61 if they were
47. U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 46, 48.
48. Id. at 46.
49. Id. at 46, 52-54 (The appellate court agreed with the district court’s definition of the relevant
market as the “licensing of all Intel-compatible PC operating systems worldwide.” The district court
also properly excluded middleware from that definition of the relevant market.).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
51. U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 80.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1; U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 84.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
54. U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 46 (The district court also did not hold an evidentiary hearing on
the remedy and did not give adequate reasons for the remedy.). The district court did not explain how
the remedy would unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct.
55. Id.
56. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S., 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
57. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24272 at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2001).
58. Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin settled. 66 Fed. Reg. 59452 (Nov. 28, 2001). Over 32,000 public comments were received, and
modifications were made to the consent decree. 67 Fed. Reg. 23654 (May 3, 2002).
59. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
60. N.Y. v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
61. See Keegan, supra n. 19.
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slightly modified to allow the court to take action sua sponte concerning
the enforcement of the decree. The final consent decree was entered.62
The district court analogized applying a remedy in this case to shoeing
a galloping horse.63 The consent decree agreed upon provides that Microsoft’s licenses with OEMs for the Windows operating systems will be uniform and will not restrict the OEM’s ability to install or display icons for
non-Microsoft middleware, distribute or promote non-Microsoft middleware, or launch non-Microsoft middleware, among other things. Microsoft
must also disclose the necessary documentation for middleware to generate
with a windows operating system product, for that sole purpose. Microsoft
may not retaliate or threaten retaliation against OEMs independent hardware vendors, or Internet service providers. The consent decree is in effect
for three years.64
In approving the consent decree, the district court needed the appellate
court’s direction to have the remedy fit the wrong.65 The district judge
chided the plaintiffs for gathering and bringing all existing complaints
against Microsoft before the court at this late stage, and for not respecting
the parameters set out by the appellate court.66 Conversely, according to
the court, Microsoft has a tendency to minimize the effects of its illegal
conduct, and the remedy is imposed despite Microsoft’s view.67
An interesting aspect in light of the E.U. Microsoft antitrust litigation
is the ruling that Microsoft need not unbundle its own applications software from Windows operating systems. The plaintiff’s only economic
expert did not endorse a remedy removing software code.68 According to
the district court, “[t]he case law is unwavering in the admonition that it is
not a proper task for the court to undertake to redesign products.”69

62. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 2002 WL 31654530 at *16 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002). The court left
enforcement to the parties and the court. Non-parties should not have direct access to the enforcement
mechanism, according to the district court. N.Y. v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 181-82.
63. N.Y. v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 184; see generally, Mark Geier, Student Author,
Antitrust: U.S. Microsoft, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 297 (2002); Thomas M. Lenard, Creating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: Alternative Structural Remedies in the Microsoft Case, 9
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 803 (2001); Adam MacLuckie, Student Author, United States v. Microsoft: A
Look at the Balancing Act Between Copyright Protection for Software, Intellectual Property Rights and
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 2 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 415 (2001/02).
64. N.Y. v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d at app. B. The disclosures will likely prove beneficial
to the development of middleware. Id. at 193.
65. U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 107.
66. N.Y. v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
67. Id. at 194. The court stated that it will hold Microsoft to its promises made during litigation to
change its predatory practices which were part of its business strategy.
68. Id. at 157.
69. Id. at 158.
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Nine states did not agree with the consent decree,70 and instead litigated a remedy that closely paralleled the consent decree.71 These states
would have preferred a broader remedy including open source licensing for
Internet Explorer and auctioning to a third party the right to move Microsoft Office to other non-Microsoft operating systems.72 After a thirty-two
day hearing on the remedy, a parallel consent decree to the negotiated plea
was entered by the district court.73 Only the Commonwealth of Massachusetts appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2004 said,
“well done” concerning the district court’s remedy, which went right to the
heart of the problem that Microsoft had created.74 The appeals court rejected Massachusetts’s claim that the district court abused its discretion by
rejecting the open-source IE remedy.75 The appellate court held that the
remedy of allowing other rival browsers was adequate.76 The remedy was
affirmed.77 Thus, the governmental action against Microsoft ended in the
United States in the summer of 2004, unless and until further action is
brought. Private antitrust actions against Microsoft have been settled.78
III. MICROSOFT V. COMMISSION
In 1998, Sun Microsystems of Palo Alto, California lodged a complaint against Microsoft of Redmond, Washington with the European
Commission alleging that Microsoft had a dominant position in the PC
operating system market, and that Microsoft violated section eighty-two of

70. California, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Utah, West Virginia,
and the District of Columbia did not sign the consent decree. Mass. v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d at
1205.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1206-07.
73. Id. at 1205.
74. Id. at 1210.
75. Id. at 1204.
76. Id. at 1222.
77. Id. at 1250. The order approving the consent decree was also affirmed. The order denying the
right of the CCIA and the SIIA was reversed, however. Robert Bork argued for CCIA with Kenneth
Starr on the brief.
78. Microsoft has reportedly spent more than $3 billion to settle lawsuits. In November 2004 Microsoft reportedly paid $536 million to Norvell to settle, and settled with other litigants including Sun
and Time Warner. John R. Wilke, Microsoft Faces Allegations on Conduct, Wall St. J. (N.Y.C., N.Y.)
A3 (Nov. 17, 2004). Microsoft has also settled with the CCIA, see Mass. v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d
at 1205, and the CCIA agreed not to seek U.S. Supreme Court review. Wilke, Wall St. J. at A3; see
generally, Ramona Mateiu, Student Author, Antitrust: Private Antitrust Suits: In Re Microsoft Antitrust
Litigation, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 295 (2002).
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the Treaty Establishing the European Community79 by keeping confidential
the information that work group server operating systems need to fully
interoperate with Microsoft’s PC operating systems.80 In 2000, the Commission began an investigation on its own concerning Microsoft’s incorporation of Windows Media Player into Windows PC operating systems.
Two Statements of Objections on these two issues were sent by the Commission to Microsoft in 2000 and 2001; Microsoft responded to both by
commenting on the Commission’s preliminary finding of fact and law,81
and Microsoft additionally submitted forty-six customer statements in response. The Commission itself in 2002 requested information from these
forty-six customers.82
In 2003, the Commission engaged in a wider market inquiry of seventy-five E.U. randomly selected firms.83 Microsoft requested and got an
oral hearing in 2003, and had access to the file five times during this process.84
On March 24, 2004 the Commission issued a thorough and exhaustive
decision concluding that Microsoft has a dominant position under article
82 of the Treaty in the market for work group server operating systems.85
Article 82 applies because Microsoft’s conduct affects trade between
member states.86 The relevant product market is the market for operating
systems for client PCs87 and the relevant geographic market is worldwide.
The Court of Justice defines a dominant position under article 82 of the
Treaty as:
[A] position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained
on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an

79. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra n. 7, at art. 82. Under article 82
of the Treaty, any abuse by one or more undertaking having a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it is prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it
may affect trade between member states.
80. COMP/C-3/37.792, at 2. Sun had previously requested from Microsoft the complete information necessary for Sun to provide support for Windows operating system. Sun requested the specifications for the protocols used by Windows work group server to provide services to Windows work
group networks. Id. at 54. Microsoft’s response was that the information is already available to Sun
and every other software developer through the Microsoft Developer Network. Id. at 56.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. Seventy-one responded.
84. Id. at 7-8.
85. Id. at 146.
86. Id. at 88.
87. Id. at 92.
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appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers
and ultimately of the consumers.88
The Commission determined that Microsoft has a high market share in
the market for work group server operating systems.89 This high market
share, along with barriers to entry and links to the client PC operating system market, led Microsoft to a dominant position in the work group server
operating system.90
Having a dominant position, however, is not contrary to E.U. competition rules, unless that position leads to abuse.91 The Commission further
determined that Microsoft had abused its dominant position by refusing to
supply the specifications for protocols used by Windows work group
server to Sun and other competitors.92
In addition, Microsoft had a 93.8% market share for PC operating systems.93 By tying Windows Media Player to the windows operating system,
Microsoft further abused its dominant position.94
When the Commission finds article 82 has been violated, it may impose fines and remedies.95 The Commission held that the natural remedy
for Microsoft’s abusive refusal to supply was an order to supply that had
been refused.96 Microsoft was ordered to supply interoperability information within 120 days to allow competitors work group server operating
systems products to work with Windows operating systems.97 Further,
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 118.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146. The Court of Justice defined abuse as:
[A]n objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position
which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence
of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through
recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or
services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering
the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of
that competition.

Id. at 146.
92. Id. at 147.
93. Id. at 223.
94. Id. at 275.
95. Id. at 275.
96. Id. at 276. Microsoft argued that this remedy would violate the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement, but the Commission found no inconsistency. Id.
at 291-92.
97. Id. at 299. The term interoperability is defined by the Software Directive as follows:
Whereas the function of a computer program is to communicate and work together with
other components of a computer system and with users and, for this purpose a logical and,
where appropriate, physical interconnection and interaction is required to permit all ele-

File: Mota-Macroed

2005

Created on: 3/23/2005 8:54:00 PM

Last Printed: 5/11/2005 12:04:00 PM

HIDE IT OR UNBUNDLE IT

193

within ninety days, Microsoft must offer a full-functioning version of windows PC operating system without Windows Media Player.98 Finally, the
Commission (having the ability to impose a fine up to ten percent, based
on the gravity and duration of the infringement) assessed a fine to Microsoft in the amount of 497 million euros,99 or nearly $613 million, a record
fine for that body.
On December 22, 2004, the Court of First Instance denied Microsoft’s
request for interim relief.100 The full appeal is pending at the time of this
writing. The Court had the ability to suspend the Commission’s actions.101
While the Court addressed the case, CCIA and Novell withdrew their intervention.102 The Court ultimately denied the application for Microsoft’s
interim measure; Microsoft’s request for confidential treatment, however,
was granted.103
In a statement at its web site, updated February 7, 2005, Microsoft
states that the Microsoft Work Group Server Protocol Program License
Agreement grants to licensees certain Microsoft European intellectual
property rights for the purpose of interoperability.104 Further, “Microsoft
will also comply with the European Commission direction to release versions of Microsoft Windows XP in Europe that do not include certain
Windows multimedia technologies.”105

ments of software and hardware to work with other software and hardware and with users in
all the ways in which they are intended to function;
Whereas the parts of the program which provide for such interconnection and interaction between elements of software and hardware are generally known as ‘interfaces’;
Whereas this functional interconnection and interaction is generally known as ‘interoperability’; whereas such interoperability can be defined as the ability to exchange information
and mutually to use the information which has been exchanged.
Id. at 12. Microsoft unsuccessfully argued that the Commission went beyond this Software Directive
on interoperability in this case. Id.
98. Id. at 300.
99. Id. at 292-93, 297.
100. Microsoft v. Commn. of the European Communities, Case T-201/04, 2004 E.C.R. ___ (Ct. First
Instance 2004) (available at WL, EU-ALL database).
101. Id. at ¶ 70.
102. Id. at ¶ 78; see supra n. 78 and accompanying text (concerning the settlements by CCIA and
Novell with Microsoft).
103. Microsoft, Case T-201/04 at ¶ 478.
104. Microsoft, Microsoft Implementation of European Commission Decision, http://www.microsoft
.com/MSCorp/legal/eudecision/ (last updated Mar. 22, 2005).
105. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Two cases were started on two continents against Microsoft for antitrust violation in 1998. The U.S. case resulted in Microsoft having to hide
its browser;106 the E.U. case at the time of this writing has resulted in Microsoft having to remove its media player, license the code necessary for
interoperability to competitors, and pay a hefty fine.107 In some ways, differing results can be expected due to the application of different laws applied differently.108 U.S. District Judge Kellar-Kotelly adhered to the admonition not to redesign products; notably, the plaintiffs’ own economic
expert did not request any product redesign type remedy.109 Likewise, the
E.U. Commission held that the natural remedy is an order to supply what
has been refused.110 Thus, the Commission ruling reveals the more aggressive E.U. approach to Microsoft’s antitrust violations.
The E.U. Commission has taken on a proactive role in antitrust enforcement. For example, after the GE/Honeywell merger was approved in
the U.S., the Commission disallowed the merger as being incompatible
with the common market.111 This was the first time that a merger of two
U.S. firms, approved in the U.S., was disallowed in the E.U. Although at
the time of this writing the disallowance is being appealed to the Court of
First Instance, the merger did not occur. In another merger blocked by the
Commission, the Court of First Instance held on September 28, 2004 that
the Commission’s blocking of MCI WorldCom’s purchase of Sprint in
2000 was erroneous.112 It remains to be seen whether the Court of First
Instance will again reverse the Commission in the Microsoft case.
In the meantime, Microsoft’s antitrust woes are not over. In July,
2004, Japan’s Fair Trade Commission issued a warning against Microsoft
for suspected anti-monopoly violations over restrictive contracts with
companies using Windows operating systems. This case could go to the
Tokyo High Court.113 Microsoft’s antitrust problems seem to be spreading
and may now be shifting to Japan.
106. See supra nn. 74-78 and accompanying text.
107. See supra nn. 78, 99-102 and accompanying text.
108. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act were applied in the U.S. actions. See supra nn. 12-13 and
accompanying text. Article 82 of the Treaty was applied in the E.U. action. See supra n. 79 and accompanying text.
109. See supra nn. 68-69 and accompanying text.
110. See supra n. 95 and accompanying text.
111. Gen. Electric/Honeywell COMP/M.2220, http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases
/decisions/m2220_en.pdf (Mar. 7, 2001).
112. MCI, Inc. v. Commission, Case T-310/00, 2004 E.C.R. ___ (Ct. First Instance 2004) (available at
WL, EU-ALL database).
113. Japanese Commission Warns Contracts May Violate Law, 244 Wall St. J. (N.Y.C., N.Y.) D5
(July 14, 2004).

